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With many emerging market currencies tied to the U.S. dollar either implicitly or explicitly, 
movements in the exchange values of the currencies of major countries have the potential to influence 
the competitive position of many developing countries. According to some analysts, establishing target 
bands to reduce the variability of the G-3 currencies would limit those destabilizing shocks emanating 
from abroad. This paper examines the argument for such a target zone strictly from an emerging 
market perspective. Given that sterilized intervention by industrial economies tends to be ineffective 
and that policy makers show no appetite to return to the controls on international capital flows that 
helped keep exchange rates stable over the Bretton Woods era, a commitment to damping G-3 
exchange rate fluctuations requires a willingness on the part of G-3 authorities to use domestic 
monetary policy to that end. Under a system of target zones, then, relative prices for emerging market 
economies may become more stable, but debt-servicing costs may become less predictable. We use a 
simple trade model to show that the resulting consequences for welfare are ambiguous. Our empirical 
work supplements the traditional literature on North-South links by examining the importance of the 
volatilities of G-3 exchange-rates, and U.S. interest rate and consumption on capital flows and 
economic growth in developing countries over the past thirty years. 
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 I.  Introduction 
 
While fashions concerning appropriate exchange rate arrangements have shifted over 
the years, advocacy of establishing a target zone surrounding the world’s three major 
currencies has remained a hardy perennial.  Work on target zones (pioneered by McKinnon, 
1997, and Williamson, 1986, and recently summarized by Clarida, 1999) has mostly 
emphasized the benefits of exchange rate stability for industrial countries.  More recently, 
though, analysts have apportioned some of the blame for financial crises in emerging markets 
back on the shoulders of the volatile bilateral exchange rates of industrial countries (as in the 
dissenting opinions registered in Goldstein, 1999, for instance).  With many emerging market 
currencies tied to the U.S. dollar either implicitly or explicitly, movements in the exchange 
values of the currencies of major countries–in particular the prolonged appreciation of the 
U.S. dollar vis-a-vis the yen and the deutsche mark in advance of Asia’s troubles–is argued to 
have worsened the competitive position of many emerging market economies.  One solution 
to reducing destabilizing shocks emanating from abroad, the argument runs, would be to 
reduce the variability of the G-3 currencies by establishing target bands.1  This paper 
examines the argument for such a target zone strictly from an emerging market perspective 
but will be silent on the costs and benefits for industrial countries.   
                                                 
1  Of course, since European monetary union, the G-3 currencies cover at least fourteen 
countries–the United States, Japan, and the twelve nations that have adopted the euro.  In what 
follows, we splice together the pre-single-currency data on the deutsche mark with the post-1999 
data on the exchange value of the euro.  
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Given the reality that sterilized intervention by industrial economies tends to be 
ineffective and that policy makers show no appetite to return to the kinds of controls on 
international capital flows that helped keep exchange rates stable over the Bretton Woods 
era, a commitment to damping G-3 exchange rate fluctuations requires a willingness on the 
part of G-3 authorities to use domestic monetary policy to that end--this, in turn, may 
require tolerating more variable interest rates.  However, while trading patterns may become 
more stable in an environment of predictable G-3 exchange rates, debt-servicing costs do not 
as a result of the greater variability of international interest rates.  The welfare consequences 
to an emerging market economy, therefore, are ambiguous, depending on initial conditions, 
the specification of behavior, and the dynamic nature of the tradeoff between lower G-3 
exchange rate volatility and higher G-3 interest rate variability.   
The consequences for the developing “South” of interest rate and exchange rate 
volatility in the “North” is only one particular aspect of the myriad North-South links.  As 
such, issues related to G-3 exchange rate variability should be viewed within the much larger 
panorama (and related literature) of how economic outcomes in developed countries 
influence those in less developed economies.   In this paper, we review and revisit the 
“traditional” North-South links via trade, commodity markets, and capital flows, and add 
tranmission channels in the form of interest-rate and exchange-rate volatilities. 
In Section II, we discuss the various channels of North-South transmission and use 
the example of a simple trade model to establish that, for a small open economy with 
outstanding debt, the welfare effect of damping variations in the exchange rate by making 
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international interest rates more volatile is ambiguous.  Section III presents stylized evidence 
on how the monetary policy and economic cycle in the United States influence capital flows 
to emerging markets as well as growth.  In Section IV, we first examine the contribution of 
G-3 exchange rate volatility to fluctuations in the exchange rates of emerging markets and 
proceed to analyze the link between G-3 interest rate and exchange rate volatility and capital 
flows and economic growth in developing countries. The final section summarizes our main 
findings and discusses some of the policy implications of our analysis.   
 
 Section II. North-South Links 
In this section, we discuss the various channels through which economic 
developments in the major developed economies can potentially affect developing countries. 
 On the developed side, we examine how the exchange-rate arrangements among industrial 
countries influence the mix of interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility on world financial 
markets.  On the emerging markets side, our focus is on capital flows--their level and 
composition--and on economic performance, as measured by GDP growth. 
1.  The Winds from the North:  The Role of G-3 Exchange Rate Arrangements in 
Determining the Mix of Interest-Rate and Exchange-Rate Volatilities 
In principle, G-3 exchange rates could be induced to stay within a target bands 
through some combination of three tools.  First, national authorities could rely on sterilized 
intervention to enforce some corridor on bilateral exchange rates.  However, except to the 
extent that such intervention tends to signal future changes in domestic monetary policy, 
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researchers have found little empirical support that sterilized intervention in industrial 
countries is effective.2  Second, national authorities could impose some form of exchange or 
capital control, presumably in the form of a transactions tax or framed as prudential reserve 
requirements.  Opponents of such efforts generally argue that capital controls generate 
financial innovation that undercuts them over time, implying that the controls either become 
increasingly complicated or irrelevant.  Third, monetary policy makers in the major countries 
could alter domestic market conditions to keep the foreign exchange value of their currencies 
in a desired range.  This could take the form of allowing intervention in the currency market 
to affect domestic reserves–that is, not sterilizing intervention–or more directly keying the 
domestic policy rate to the exchange value of the currency (as discussed in McKinnon, 1997, 
and Williamson, 1986). 
Given the lack of evidence finding any independent effect of sterilized intervention 
(over and beyond what subsequently happens to domestic monetary policy) and the 
consensus supporting the free mobility of capital internationally, it would seem that the only 
instrument available to enforce a target zone would be domestic monetary policy of the G-3 
central banks.  But this implies some tradeoff, in that G-3 domestic short-term interest rates 
would have to become more variable to make G-3 exchange rates smoother. 
To understand the trade-off between G-3 interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility 
from an emerging markets perspective, it is important to remember that most developing 
                                                 
2  The signaling channel is addressed by Kaminsky and Lewis (1996); Dominguez and 
Frankel (1993) examine whether there are any portfolio effects of sterilized intervention.   
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countries are net debtors to the industrial world and typically that debt is short-term and 
denominated in one of the G-3 currencies.  As a result, the welfare consequences for an 
emerging-market economy of G-3 target zones depends on exactly how those zones are 
enforced and the particulars of the small country’s mix of output, trading partners, and debt 
structure.   
 
2.  A Stylized Model of an Emerging-Market Economy 
The effects of trading interest-rate for exchange rate volatility can be seen in a basic 
single-period, two-good model of trade for a small open economy, as in Figure 1.  This figure 
is drawn for a country taking as given the relative price of the two traded goods that receives 
an endowment in terms of good A.  For simplicity, we assume that its external debt is 
denominated in terms of good A and its currency is pegged to that of country A.3  Volatility 
of the relative price of the traded goods–which might stem solely from nominal changes in 
exchange rates between the industrial countries if the small country fixes its exchange rate or 
if it prices to the industrial country market–pivots the budget line and thus alters the desired 
consumption combination in the small country.  Suppose, for instance, that the currency of 
country A depreciates relative to that of country B, rotating the budget line from EF to GF.  
                                                 
3  Behind the scenes of this model in the larger industrial world, it is simplest to think of two 
large countries, A and B, specialized in the production of their namesake good.  The net effect of 
our assumption about the small economy’s endowment and debt structure is that the intercept of the 
budget line depends on the interest rate in country A. 
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All else equal, welfare would decline, representing a cost associated with developments on 
the foreign exchange market for this small country. 
Target zones for the large countries, if effective, would be able to prevent the budget 
line from rotating as the result of influences emanating from the developed world.  However, 
this reduced major-country exchange rate volatility will only be accomplished if the major 
central banks change short-term interest rates in response to incipient changes in cross rates. 
 For most emerging-market economies, which are debtors, such coordination of G-3 
monetary policy could deliver more stable terms of trade at the expense of a more variable 
interest service.  In this particular case, the central bank of country A would presumably have 
to raise its domestic short-term interest rate in defense of the currency.  So, while the slope 
of the budget line would be unchanged, its location would shift in, as labeled HI.  Regardless 
of whether the effects of the initial shock were felt through the exchange rate of the interest 
rate, welfare in this small country would decline.  Whether they decline more or less if the 
large countries allow the cross exchange rate or their interest rates to adjust will depend on 
many factors. 
3.  Going Beyond the Stylized Model 
In reality, many developing countries send primary commodities onto the world 
market, there is some substitutability in world demand for those countries that produce 
manufactured products, and capital markets are far from perfect.  In this section, we use the 
traditional North-South linkages to broaden our understanding of the issues related to G-3 
exchange rate arrangements. 
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As opposed to the simple example, most emerging-market economies face some 
slope to the demand curve for their exports.  As a result, a slowdown in a large developed 
economy will have adverse consequences for its trading partners to the extent that imports in 
the developed economy have a positive income elasticity.  This channel, as it relies on the 
behavior of the large partner, is present irrespective of the level of development of the 
smaller trading partners.  The higher the share of exports of the country that are destined for 
the country experiencing the economic downturn, the more negative the consequences.  On 
the basis of this channel, for example, Mexico and Canada would be far more affected by an 
economic downturn in the United States than Argentina. This follows because in 1999 about 
88 percent of all Canadian and Mexican exports were shipped to the U.S. market, while only 
about 11 of Argentina’s exports were destined for the United States.4  Other things equal, the 
higher the income elasticity of imports in the developed country, the more pronounced will 
be the contraction in the country’s exports.  In this regard, developing countries which 
export predominantly manufactured goods (which typically are more sensitive to income) 
may fare worse that their counterparts exporting primary commodities, which tend to be 
relatively income-inelastic.5  The heterogeneity in export structure across developing 
countries are sufficiently significant to expect, a priori, highly differentiated outcomes.  For 
instance, the contrast between the export structure of East Asian countries (which are heavily 
                                                 
4 The stylized evidence on patterns of trade is discussed in the next session. 
5  See, for example, Reinhart (1996), who estimates industrial countries’ import demand 
function for various regions and countries with varying degrees of export diversification and primary 
commodity content. 
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weighed to manufactured goods) to that of most African countries (which are predominantly 
skewed to primary commodities) is particularly striking.6 
                                                 
6 For example, manufactures account for only 10 percent in Côte D’Ivoire but account for 
more than 65 percent of Thai exports. 
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As opposed to the simple example, emerging market economies generally produce a 
different mix of goods than those of industrial countries.  In that case, the business cycle in 
the world’s largest economies may itself exert a significant influence on the terms of trade of 
their smaller developing trading partners, as argued in Dornbusch (1985).  Perhaps, the 
clearest example of such a North-South link comes from international commodity markets.  
The literature on commodity price determination has consistently accorded a significant role 
to the growth performance of the major industrial countries. 7  Recessions in industrial 
economies, particularly the United States, have historically been associated with weakness in 
real commodity prices.  In our simple example, if the small country’s endowment was made 
up of a commodity, the effects of G-3 monetary policy actions on overall demand for those 
primary goods could induce more sizable shifts in the position of the budget line.  
                                                 
7 See, for example, Dornbusch (1986); he stresses the role of the demand side in commodity 
price determination.  Borensztein and Reinhart (1995), who incorporate supply-side developments in 
their analysis, also find a significant and positive relationship between growth in the major 
economies and world commodity prices. 
Yet, the impacts of fluctuations in the business cycle on developing economies is 
likely not limited just to income and relative price effects.  There is a well-established, 
endogenous and countercyclical “monetary policy cycle” in the major developed economies. 
To damp the amplitude of the business cycle, central banks ease monetary conditions and 
reduce interest rates during economic downturns and hike interest rates when signs of 
overheating develop.  Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) stressed the importance of U.S. 
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interest rates in driving the international capital flow cycle.  They present evidence that, in 
periods of low interest rates in the United States, central banks in developing countries in 
Latin America systematically accumulate foreign exchange reserves and the real exchange 
rate appreciates.  Subsequent studies that examined net capital flows and extended the 
analysis to a variety of their components over various sample periods and that extended the 
analysis to developing countries in other regions found similar evidence. This link between 
the interest rate and capital flow cycle may arise for a variety of reasons.  Investors in the 
developed economies faced with lower interest rates may be inclined to seek higher returns 
elsewhere (i.e., the demand for developing country assets increases).  It also might be the 
case that the decline in international interest rates makes borrowing less costly for emerging 
markets and increases the supply of emerging market debt.  As illustrated in the interest rate 
parity condition below, where εe denotes the expected change in the exchange rate, the 
decline in the cost of borrowing for emerging-market countries (i) may be even greater than 
the decline in international interest rates (i*) if the country risk premia (ρ) is itself a positive 
function of international interest rates,  
The evidence presented in Fernandez-Arias (1996), Frankel et. al. (2000), and 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) support the notion that country-risk premia in many 
emerging markets indeed move with international interest rates in a manner that amplifies 
the interest rate cycle of industrial countries.  If that is the case, a change in G-3 interest rates 
0. >      , + (i*) +* i =i e ρερ ′  
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shifts the budget line by more than given in our simple example, as procyclical capital flows 
imply that the change in the industrial country interest rate changes the developing country’s 
interest-rate risk premium in the same direction.  Moreover, one could posit nonlinearities in 
the response if large increases in borrowing costs--by inducing balance-sheet strains and 
credit rationing--have more substantial effects on income prospects than do similar size 
reductions in borrowing costs.   
Taken together, these findings would suggest that the trade and finance effects that 
arise from the growth and interest rate cycles, respectively, in developed economies tend to, 
at least partially offset.  The countries that would benefit the most from the interest rate cycle 
may well be those that start from a shakier financial position--that is the ones with the higher 
international debt-to-reserves ratio.  This is so because these countries would benefit the 
most from a decline in debt-servicing costs (possibly also owing to a proportionally larger 
decline in their risk premia) and lose the least in the interest earnings from holding 
international reserves.  For example, a country like China, which has a low level of external 
debt and a high level of external reserves might even benefit from interest rate increases in 
the United States.  For low-income countries that have no access to international capital 
markets under any interest rate scenario, this capital flow-debt servicing channel would not 
be present at all. 
However, G-3 exchange rate and interest rate volatility would seem a priori to have a 
negative effect on economic growth in the developing world.  Higher interest rate volatility 
may hamper investment, while higher G-3 exchange rate volatility may retard emerging 
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market trade.8 While the literature on the impacts on trade of exchange rate volatility for 
developed economies is inconclusive, the comparable analysis of this issue for emerging 
markets seems overwhelmingly to reach the conclusion that exchange rate volatility tends to 
reduce trade. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the channels of transmission of how developments in 
the major industrial countries may influence growth in emerging markets. 
                                                 
8 Of course, G-3 interest rate volatility may also complicate significantly emerging market 
debt management strategies or make systemic strains more likely. 
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 Table 1.  Developed and Developing Country Links 
 
Type of shock 
 
Transmission channel 
 
Amplifiers 
 
Expected growth 
consequences 
 
The growth cycle: 
Recessions in the G-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Income effects 
 
Trade: Lower exports to G-3 
 
High trade exposure 
High G-3 income elasticities 
 
Negative 
 
   Relative price effects 
 
Trade: Decline in the terms of 
trade for developing countries 
 
High primary commodity 
content in exports 
High exposure to cyclical 
industries in exports 
 
Negative 
 
   International capital 
flows 
 
Finance: Higher capital flows 
(primarily bank lending) to 
emerging markets 
 
Large declines in the domestic 
demand for bank loans 
 
Positive,  
 
The interest rate cycle: 
Monetary easings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International capital flows 
 
Finance: Higher portfolio 
capital flows to emerging 
markets 
 
Developed bond and equity 
markets. High interest 
sensitivity of flows. 
 
Positive 
 
Debt servicing 
 
Finance: Lower cost 
 
High levels of debt 
Sensitive risk premia to 
international interest rates 
 
Positive 
 
Interest earnings 
 
Finance: Declining interest 
income 
 
High level of reserves relative 
to debt 
 
Not obvious 
 
High volatility in G-3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interest rates 
 
Finance: Complicates debt 
management 
 
High levels of short term debt 
Large new financing needs 
 
Not obvious 
 
 
 
Investment: Uncertainty tends 
to reduce investment 
consequences 
 
An initially high level of FDI 
 
Negative 
 
Bilateral exchange rate 
 
Trade: Reduces trade 
 
Pegging to a G-3 currency 
 
Negative? 
 
 III.  The Role of the North’s Business and Monetary Policy Cycles: The Stylized 
Facts 
In this section, we present stylized evidence on the “North-South” links that were 
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discussed in the preceding section. For emerging markets, we examine international capital 
flows and growth around various measures of the United States growth and interest rate 
cycle and contrast periods of high interest rate and exchange rate volatility to those where 
volatility was relatively subdued. We present evidence of the direction of “ North-South” 
trade and on the impact of G-3 developments on international commodity markets. 
Our data is annual and spans 1970 to 1999, and the country groupings are those 
reported in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO).  For capital 
flows, these groupings include: All emerging markets, Africa, Asia crisis countries, other 
Asian emerging markets, Middle East and Europe, Western Hemisphere, and Countries in 
Transition. In reporting aggregate real GDP, the WEO groups the Asian countries somewhat 
differently; the two reported subgroupings are newly industrialized Asia and Asia; all other 
categories remain the same.9 We examine the cyclical behavior of net private capital flows 
and its components: net private direct investment (FDI), private portfolio investment (PI), 
other net private capital flows (OTF)--which is heavily weighed toward bank lending, and net 
official flows (OFF).   
1. The growth cycle, capital flows, and emerging market growth 
                                                 
9 Details on the individual series and country coverage are provided in the Data Appendix. 
Given its prominent position in the world economy, the United States business cycle 
(not surprisingly) has important repercussions for the rest of the world.  Economic 
developments in the United States echo loudly in many developed economies--most notably 
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Canada; the same holds true for developing economies, especially so those in the Western 
Hemisphere and newly-industrialized Asia.  To examine the behavior of growth and various 
types of capital flows to emerging markets, we first split the sample into two states of nature 
according to two criteria.  The first parsing separates the sample into recessions and 
expansions according to the National Bureau of Economic Research’s dating of U.S. 
business cycle turning points.  The second cut of the data divides the sample into those 
periods in which U.S. real GDP growth is above the median growth rate for the sample and 
those in which growth is below the median.  Figures 2 and 3 depict capital flows to emerging 
markets (billions of U.S. dollars in 1970 terms) in recession years versus recovery years for 
the 1970-1999 period.  The picture shown in the top panel of Figure 2 reveals that net flows 
to emerging markets are almost twice as large when the United States is in expansion (almost 
US $60 billion) as when the United States is in recession.  Furthermore, this vast gap between 
recession and expansion owes primarily to a surge in FDI flows (which nearly go up fivefold 
from recession to expansion) and to portfolio flows (Figure 3, top panel).  Indeed, other net 
inflows to emerging markets fall from about US $17 billion, when the U.S. is in recession to 
about US $8 billion of net outflows in expansions (Figure 3, bottom panel).   This disparate 
behavior between FDI and portfolio flows importantly owes to bank lending, which 
accounts for a significant part of other flows.  Apparently, banks tend to seek lending 
opportunities abroad when the domestic demand for loans weakens, as it usually does during 
recessions.   The U.S. bank lending boom to Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
and the surge in Japanese bank lending to emerging Asia in the mid-1990s are two clear 
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examples of this phenomena.  
However, the surge in FDI flows from the mid-1990s to the present is a significant 
departure from FDI’s historical behavior that is, no doubt, heavily influenced by the wave of 
privatization and mergers and acquisitions that took hold in many emerging markets during 
recent years.  It is possible that because this period of privatizations and surging FDI is 
coincident with the longest economic expansion in U.S. history, the results may be skewed 
toward finding an exaggerated role for U.S. growth in driving FDI and total net flows.  When 
we end our sample in 1992, which is two years following the only U.S. recession in the 1990s, 
capital flows to emerging markets still diminish during economic upturns in the United 
States.  While FDI flows and portfolio flows continue to be higher in expansions than in 
recessions, the drop in other flows during expansions more than offsets this.   As a 
robustness check of the NBER business-cycle data, we also split the sample into years in 
which U.S. real GDP growth is above the median growth rate for the sample and those in 
which growth is below the median and a similar pattern of flows.   
In sum, from the vantage point of the volume of capital flows to emerging markets--
U.S. recessions are not a bad thing.  From a compositional standpoint, however, the more 
stable component of capital flows, FDI, does seem to contract during downturns--suggesting 
that emerging markets may wind up during these periods relying more heavily on less stable 
sources of financing--short-term flows.10 
The analogous exercise was performed for emerging market average annual GDP 
                                                 
10  Other flows are mostly short-term. 
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growth. As shown in Table 1, for all developing countries, growth is somewhat slower during 
U.S. recessions, averaging 4.8 percent per annum versus 5.2 percent average growth during 
expansion years. However, the pattern is uneven across regions.  For the countries in 
transition, Asia (including the newly-industrialized economies), and the Middle East and 
Europe growth tend to slow during U.S. recessions while for Africa and Western 
Hemisphere, 
  the opposite is true.  However, in most instances the differences across regimes are not 
markedly different--an issue we will explore further later. 
Table 2. Economic Growth and the U.S. Business Cycle, 1970-1999 
Average Annual real GDP Growth (in percent) 
 
 
Major Regional Groupings 
 
Entire Period 
 
During U.S. 
Recessions 
 
During U.S. 
Expansions 
 
Newly Industrialized Asian 
Economies 
 
7.68
 
7.11
 
7.79
 
Developing Countries 
 
5.08
 
4.82
 
5.21
 
Africa 
 
2.91
 
3.29
 
2.77
 
Asia 
 
6.57
 
6.25
 
6.69
 
Middle East and Europe 
 
4.43
 
4.31
 
4.52
 
Western Hemisphere 
 
3.69
 
3.81
 
3.58
 
Countries in Transition 
 
1.51
 
2.71
 
0.88
Source: The authors and World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund. 
2. The growth cycle and trade 
If economic downturns in the United States are not necessarily a bad thing from the 
vantage point of the availability of international lending to emerging markets, slowdowns are 
likely to have adverse consequences for countries that rely heavily on exports to the United 
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States.  Table 3 reports the percentage of total exports (as of 1999) of various emerging 
markets in Africa, Asia, and Western Hemisphere that are destined for the United States 
market.  It is evident that bilateral trade links between the United States and the developing 
world are strongest for Latin America, although there is considerable variation within the 
region with Mexico and Argentina sitting at the opposite ends of the spectrum. However, 
trade between the United States and the Asian countries shown in this table is, by no means, 
trivial, especially if one considers that (as shown in Table 4) the income elasticity in 
developed economies for Asian exports typically is estimated to be more than twice as large 
as the income elasticity for African exports; more generally, the income elasticity of the 
exports of developing countries that are major exporters of manufactured goods is well 
above that of those whose exports have a higher primary commodity content. 
 Table 3. North-South Trade Patterns: 1999 
 
Region/Country 
 
 
Exports to the United 
States 
as a share of total 
exports (in percent) 
 
Imports from the United 
States as a share of total 
imports (in percent) 
 
 Latin America 
 
Argentina 
 
11.3 
 
19.6 
 
Brazil 
 
22.5 
 
23.8 
 
Chile 
 
19.4 
 
22.9 
 
Colombia 
 
50.3 
 
32.1 
 
Peru 
 
29.3 
 
31.6 
 
Mexico 
 
88.3 
 
74.1 
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Venezuela 55.4 42.0 
 
 Asia 
 
China Mainland 
 
21.5
 
11.8 
 
Indonesia 
 
16.1
 
7.3 
 
Korea 
 
20.6
 
20.8 
 
Malaysia 
 
21.9
 
17.4 
 
Philippines 
 
29.6
 
20.3 
 
Singapore 
 
19.2
 
17.1 
 
Thailand 
 
21.5
 
11.5 
 
 Africa 
 
Chad 
 
7.2 
 
2.1 
 
Congo, Rep of 
 
19.0 
 
3.5 
 
Ethiopia 
 
8.4 
 
4.9 
 
Kenya 
 
4.6 
 
6.7 
 
Mozambique 
 
4.8 
 
3.7 
 
South Africa 
 
8.2 
 
13.3 
 
Uganda 
 
5.4 
 
3.3 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
5.8 
 
4.8 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund (2000). 
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 Table 4. Industrial Countries Demand for Developing Country Exports 
 
Study and Sample 
Period 
 
Importing 
country 
 
Exporting country  
 
 Income 
Elasticity 
 
Dornbusch (1985), 
1960-1983 
 
 
 
All non-oil developing 
 
1.74 
 
 
 
 
 
Major exporters of manufactures 
 
2.67 
 
Marquez (1990) 
 
Canada 
 
Non OPEC developing 
 
2.83 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
Non OPEC developing 
 
2.29 
 
 
 
Japan 
 
Non OPEC developing 
 
1.22 
 
 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Non OPEC developing 
 
1.45 
 
 
 
United States 
 
Non OPEC developing 
 
3.04 
 
 
 
Rest of OECD 
 
Non OPEC developing 
 
2.61 
 
Reinhart (1995), 1970-
1991 
 
All developed 
 
 All developing 
 
2.05 
 
 
 
 
 
     Africa 
 
1.25 
 
 
 
 
 
     Asia 
 
2.49 
 
 
 
 
 
     Latin America 
 
2.07 
 
As noted earlier, swings in the economic cycle in the United States and other major 
industrialized economies have had a systematic impact on the terms of trade of primary-
commodity exporters.  According to the various studies reviewed in Table 5, a one 
percentage point drop in industrial production growth in the developed economies results in 
a drop in real commodity prices of roughly 0.77 to about 2 percent, depending on the study. 
 Table 5. Commodity Prices and Economic Cycles: A Review 
 
Study 
 
Dependent 
variable/sample 
period 
 
Measure of developed-
country growth rate used  
 
Coefficient 
 
Borensztein 
 
All commodity index/ Industrial production for 
 
1.40 
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and Reinhart 
(1994) 
1971:1-1992:3, 
quarterly 
developed economies 
 
 
 
All commodity index/ 
1971:1-1992:3, 
quarterly 
 
Industrial production for 
developed economies plus 
GDP for the Former Soviet 
Union 
 
1.54 
 
Chu and 
Morrison 
(1984) 
 
All commodity index/ 
1958-1982, quarterly 
 
GDP weighted industrial 
production-G-7 countries 
 
1.66 
 
Dornbusch 
(1985) 
 
All commodity index/ 
1970:2-1985:1, 
quarterly 
 
OECD industrial production 
 
2.07 
 
Holtham 
(1988) 
 
All commodity index/ 
1967:2-1982:2, 
semiannual 
 
GDP growth for the G-7 
economies 
 
0.51 
 
 
 
 
 
Industrial production for the 
G-7 economies 
 
0.77 
 
3. The interest rate-monetary policy cycle 
As noted earlier, in a world of countercyclical monetary policy in industrial countries, 
an economic cycle goes hand in hand with an interest-rate cycle.  As with the growth cycle, 
we proceed to describe the stylized evidence by breaking up the sample in two ways.  First, 
we subdivide the 1970-1999 sample into two subsamples, one where monetary policy was 
“easing”--that is to say that the federal funds rate was declining--and periods of tightening, 
where the federal funds rate was rising.11  However, this cut of the data does not discriminate 
between a modest and marked policy changes, as a 50 basis point drop in the federal funds 
rate during a given year would be lumped together with a 400 basis point drop. To get at this 
issue, we also break the sample into periods where real interest rates are above the sample 
                                                 
11More specifically, a year was denoted as one of tightening (easing) if the average 
level of the federal funds rate in December was higher (lower) than that of twelve months 
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median and those years in which rates are below the median. 12   
Figures 4 and 5 report the results of this exercise. The outcomes are consistent, 
irrespective of whether the observations are split along the lines of rising versus falling 
interest rates or real interest rate levels above or below their median, or whether the sample 
ends in 1999 or 1992.  In years when U.S. monetary policy was easing, emerging markets in 
all regions (with the exception of Africa, which is almost entirely shut out of international 
capital markets) receive a markedly higher volume of capital inflows.  While FDI and 
portfolio flows do not change much, other (short-term) flows respond markedly to the 
interest rate cycle.   
As Figures 8 and 9 illustrate, the surge in net private inflows is even more dramatic 
when the sample is split according to whether interest rates are above or below their sample 
median.  As before, Africa is the only region unaffected by the interest rate cycle in the 
United States.  Performing the same exercises on emerging market GDP growth, however, 
does not yield any obviously intuitive results.  By and large, average annual GDP growth 
rates are lower during easings of U.S. monetary policy than during tightening episodes--
which may simply attest to the fact that Federal Reserve easings most often coincide with a 
U.S. economic slowdown.  It may also suggest that, to the extent that capital inflows have 
                                                                                                                                                             
earlier. 
12 Real ex post interest rates are calculated as the nominal yield on a three-month Treasury 
bill less the annual  consumer price inflation rate. 
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positive consequences for economic activity (an important issue that has not received much 
attention in the literature), these effects may not be contemporaneous. 
 
Table 6. Economic Growth and U.S. Monetary Policy, 1970-1999 
Average Annual real GDP Growth (in percent) 
 
Major Regional Groupings 
 
Entire Period 
 
During U.S. 
Tightenings 
 
During U.S. 
Easings 
 
Newly Industrialized Asian 
Economies 
 
7.68 
 
8.79 
 
6.93 
 
Developing Countries 
 
5.08 
 
5.17 
 
5.02 
 
Africa 
 
2.91 
 
2.63 
 
3.10 
 
Asia 
 
6.57 
 
6.72 
 
6.46 
 
Middle East and Europe 
 
4.43 
 
3.87 
 
4.80 
 
Western Hemisphere 
 
3.69 
 
4.21 
 
3.34 
 
Countries in Transition 
 
1.51 
 
2.96 
 
0.65 
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund. 
In the preceding sub-section, we discussed the stylized evidence on capital flows, 
growth and G-3 developments. In what follows, we take that analysis further by examining 
the interaction between the “twin” monetary policy-growth cycles and capital flows and its 
components. 
4. Stylized evidence on the twin cycles 
Table 7 cuts the sample into four states of nature for the United States:  recession 
accompanied by monetary policy tightening, recession accompanied by easing, expansion and 
tightening, and expansion and monetary policy easing.  Our priors as regards emerging 
markets growth are straightforward:  high U.S. growth and easier monetary policy would 
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provide the best conditions for more rapid growth in emerging markets.  As to capital flows, 
the priors are less well defined. On the one hand, the Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) 
hypothesis would suggest that tighter monetary policy (i.e., rising interest rates) would lead to 
(other things equal) lower capital flows to emerging markets. On the other hand, while 
recessions in the North may dampen FDI flows (as these are often linked to trade), 
economic slowdowns tend to be accompanied by a weakening in the domestic demand for 
loans--which, in the past, has often led bank to seek lending opportunities abroad.13  In other 
words, the consequences of the U.S. cycle for capital flows is, in principle, ambiguous. 
Table 7 presents net capital flows and its components to all emerging markets during 
these four states of nature.  As the top panel indicates, net flows more than double along the 
diagonal, suggesting that both lower interest rates and faster growth in the United States are a 
potential catalyst for capital flows into emerging markets.  However, as the previous 
discussion suggested, this feature is not even across categories. FDI and portfolio flows 
thrive when expansions are coupled with falling interest rates. Other flows, which are largely 
comprised of bank lending do not.  Like other flows, these tend to increase in period of 
falling interest rates but contract during expansions; other flows are highest when the U.S. is 
in recession and interest rates are falling. 
                                                 
13 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001). 
Table 7. Real Capital Flows and the Twin Cycles: Total Emerging Market Economies 
(Billions of 1970 U.S. dollars) 
 
 
Net Private Capital Flows 
 
 
 
Recession 
 
Expansion 
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Tightening 
 
8.6 
 
13.2 
 
 
 
Easing 
 
13.9 
 
19.3 
 
Net Private Direct Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tightening 
 
3.4 
 
11.0 
 
 
 
Easing 
 
4.2 
 
11.5 
 
Net Private Portfolio 
Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tightening 
 
0.2 
 
4.0 
 
 
 
Easing 
 
1.5 
 
6.6 
 
Other Net Private Capital Flows
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tightening 
 
5.0 
 
1.8 
 
 
 
Easing 
 
8.4 
 
1.2 
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund. 
5. The repercussions twin cycles: Basic tests 
The preceding discussion does not shed light on the relative statistical significance of 
the twin cycles.  To address that issue, we next run a variety of simple regressions that 
attempt to explain capital flows and growth in emerging markets through developments in 
the developed economies, particularly the United States.  Our sample spans 1970-1999 for all 
regions except Western Hemisphere, where the debt crisis (1981-1986) period is excluded. 
The dependent variable is a real private capital flow measure that is split into four 
categories: Net capital flows, net direct investment, net portfolio flows, and other capital 
flows. The regressors in the first set of regressions are real U.S. GDP growth and the U.S. 
short-term nominal interest rate (the yield on the three-month Treasury bill).  As neither of 
these variables pose a potential endogeneity problem, our estimation method is simple 
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ordinary least squares.  Table 9 reports the results of this regression for all emerging market 
economies; (Appendix Table 1 reports results for particular regions).   
 Table 9. U.S. Determinants of Real Capital Flows: 1970-1999 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
Total Emerging Market 
Economies 
 
 
 
U.S. Real GDP 
Growth 
 
U.S. Real Interest 
Rates 
 
 
 
Net Capital Flows
 
-1.09 
(1.11)
 
-2.32 
(0.96)
 
 
 
Net Direct Investment
 
0.26 
(0.88)
 
-1.57 
(0.76)
 
 
 
Net Portfolio Investment
 
-0.33 
(0.57)
 
-1.26 
(0.50)
 
 
 
Other Net Capital Flows
 
-1.06 
(0.88)
 
0.50 
(0.71)
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
As shown in Table 9, when examining the results for the emerging market aggregate, 
as well as for most of the regional subgroups, U.S. nominal interest rates seem to play a more 
dominant and systematic role in explaining capital flows to emerging markets than U.S. 
economic growth.  As a general rule, rising U.S. interest rates are associated with falling 
capital flows to emerging markets.  In effect, in many of the regressions, the coefficient on 
growth is negative--suggesting that when the U.S. is enjoying rapid growth--capital stays at 
home.  This effect is most pronounced in Other Net Flows, which largely consists of bank 
lending.  Both FDI flows and portfolio flows are consistently interest rate sensitive.14 
                                                 
14 Similar results obtain but are not reported to save space, when developed-country 
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real GDP growth rates are used in lieu of the U.S. growth rate. 
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There are, however, various regional differences worth highlighting.15   First, U.S. 
nominal interest rates are significant in explaining portfolio and FDI flows in all regions--but 
the impacts are greatest in Western Hemisphere and lowest in Africa.  This result may simply 
highlight that, among the emerging markets with some extent of access to international 
capital markets (Asia and Latin America), the latter are more heavily indebted and 
interconnected with the United States.  Second, growth in the United States has a significant 
and positive influence in explaining FDI to Western Hemisphere--which is not the case for 
other regions. Third, as the descriptive analysis anticipated, the other capital flow category 
behaves very differently from FDI and portfolio flows. 
We next perform a comparable exercise for growth similar to Dornbusch (1985), who 
focused on the links between developing debtor countries and their developed counterparts. 
 The dependent variable was developing country GDP growth (as is the case here) while the 
independent variable was measure of OECD growth. 16 He found the coefficient on the 
OECD growth measure to be statistically significant and in the 0.28-0.76 range.  More 
recently, Frankel and Roubini (2000) regress developing country growth for various regional 
                                                 
15 This discussion is based on Appendix Tables 1-2. 
16 Dornbusch used industrial production, real GDP growth, and import volume alternatively; 
the sample was 1961-84. 
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groupings against the G-7 real interest rate; they found that the coefficients on real interest 
rates were negative and in most cases statistically significant--with the greatest interest 
sensitivity in the Western Hemisphere.17 
                                                 
17 The coefficient for Western Hemisphere was -0.77 compared to -0.39 for all market 
borrowers. 
Our exercise here combines these two approaches. As shown in Table 10, when GDP 
growth for the various country groupings is regressed against U.S. growth and real interest 
rates, the results tend to be quite intuitive. The sensitivity of growth to U.S. growth is highest 
(and statistically significant) for the newly industrialized Asian Economies, which depend 
importantly on trade with the United States and lowest for the remainder of Asia.  For all 
developing countries, both of the regressors have the anticipated signs and are statistically 
significant. A one percentage point decline in U.S. growth rates reduces GDP growth for the 
developing countries by 0.23 percent while a one percent increase in U.S. real interest rates 
reduces it by 0.27 percent.  Despite strong trade links with the United States for most 
countries in the region, U.S. growth is not statistically significant for Western Hemisphere, 
although the coefficient is positively signed. U.S. growth is also significant for the Middle 
East and European developing countries.  Given its history of relatively high levels of 
indebtedness and periodic debt-servicing difficulties, it is not surprising that the U.S. real 
interest rate is significant and growth is the most sensitive to interest rate fluctuations in 
Western Hemisphere; the coefficient (-0.88) is almost four times as large--in absolute terms--
as for all developing countries.  Indeed, one cannot reject the hypothesis that a one percent 
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increase in U.S. real interest rates leads to a one percent decline in growth in the region.  Real 
U.S. interest rates are also statistically significant for the Middle East and Europe. At the 
other end, the newly industrialized Asian economies, with low levels of external debt and 
considerable access to private capital markets, U.S. interest rates are not significant, although 
the coefficient has the (expected) negative sign.  As far as these regressions are concerned, 
U.S. developments have no systematic relationship with the rest of developing Asia or the 
transition economies. 
 Table 10.  Developing Country Growth and U.S. Developments 
 
Country Group 
 
Independent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. GDP growth 
 
U.S. Real Interest 
Rates 
 
R2 
 
Newly Industrialized 
Asian Economies 
 
0.58 
(0.26)
 
-0.21 
(0.24)
 
0.16 
 
Developing Countries 
 
0.23 
(0.11)
 
-0.27 
(0.10)
 
0.25 
 
Africa 
   
 
 
Asia 
 
-0.02 
(0.18)
 
0.20 
(0.17)
 
0.05 
 
Middle East and Europe 
 
0.50 
(0.28)
 
-0.56 
(0.27)
 
0.18 
 
Western Hemisphere 
 
0.20 
(0.38)
 
-0.88 
(0.46)
 
0.22 
 
Countries in Transition 
 
0.37 
(0.46)
 
-0.33 
(0.44)
 
0.03 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Section IV.  The Consequences of Exchange Rate  
and Interest Rate Volatility in the North 
 
To examine the issue of whether the volatility of interest rates and G-3 exchange rates 
have adverse consequences for cross-border capital flows to emerging markets and growth, 
we split our sample into periods in which volatility is high and periods in which it is low and 
conduct a comparable set of exercises as those discussed in the preceeding section. 
1.  Background on exchange rate variability in emerging markets 
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The argument that excessive volatility of G-3 exchange rates imposes significant costs 
on emerging markets seems to rely mostly on a spending channel.  A large swing in the 
dollar’s value on the foreign exchange market in terms of the yen and the euro translates 
directly into changes in the competitiveness of countries that link their currencies to the 
dollar–either through a hard peg or a highly managed float.  The evidence in Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000) suggests many developing countries fall into that group.  They report a 
widespread “fear of floating,” in that many emerging market currencies tend to track the 
dollar or the euro closely, even in cases that are officially classified as floating. 
From the perspective of aggregate spending, the relevant “exchange rate” for a small 
open economy would be some index that averages across many bilateral real exchange rates.  
Consider one such index, wi, for country i, that is the geometric mean of bilateral real 
exchange rates, sij (measured as foreign currency per unit of home currency): 
Reasonable weights, which presumably reflect bilateral or multilateral trade shares, would 
sum to one.18  Because such an index is linearly homogeneous, we can write it in terms of the 
dollar exchange rate for country i and corresponding bilateral dollar cross rates for all the 
other currencies.  That is, if si1 and σ1 are the foreign exchange value of the dollar in terms of 
units of the currency of country i and the trade share with the United States, respectively, we 
can write: 
                                                 
18  See, for instance, International Financial Statistics, where the International Monetary Fund 
calculates real effective exchange rate indexes using multilateral trade weights. 
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Thus, movements in the effective exchange rate for country i can be thought of as owing to 
movements in the dollar exchange rate of country i and all other relevant dollar cross 
exchange rates. 
For the purpose at hand, we can use the log difference in this relationship to parse the 
relative contribution of variability in the G-3 cross rates to the overall variability in emerging 
market exchange rates.  In principle, the movement in the weighted effective exchange rate 
owes to changes in the country’s exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar, the changes in the two 
bilateral G-3 exchange rates, and all other changes in bilateral dollar exchange rates, as in: 
 
The issue that concerns us is the effects of changes in the bilateral G-3 exchange rates on the 
overall volatility of the emerging market weighted exchange rate, which presumably then 
influences economic growth and capital flows. 
2.   Stylized Evidence 
Some sense of the stakes for emerging-market economies can be gotten from Figures 
8 through 11 and Tables 11 and 12.  We calculated simple annual averages of the absolute 
value of the monthly changes in the logarithms of the real deutsche mark/dollar and real 
yen/dollar exchange rates from 1974 to 1999 and the percentage point change in the real U.S 
Treasury bill rate (on the rationale that most developing country borrowing is denominated 
in U.S. dollars). 
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Figures 8 and 9 split the sample into two states of nature, those in which U.S. interest 
rate volatility is above the median and those periods in which it is below the median.  As 
before, we report the volume of real capital flows by country grouping and type across the 
sample split. When considering aggregate net private flows (Figure, 6 top panel), the results 
appear to run counter to our priors that increased uncertainty may lead to lower levels of 
cross border flows.19 Much the same can be deduced from Figure 7 for portfolio flows and 
other capital flows.  We then divided the sample into four cells corresponding to the 
combinations possible when those two volatility measures were above or below their 
respective median values.   
The top panel of Table 12 reports the average annual growth rates of real GDP in 
developing countries.  As is evident from the first column, economic growth in developing 
countries tends to be faster against a backdrop of more stable U.S. short-term interest rates.  
Moreover, over the past twenty years it would have been a bad bet for developing countries 
to trade times when G-3 foreign exchange rates were volatile but U.S. interest rates stable 
(the lower left cell) for times when G-3 foreign exchange rates were stable but U.S. interest 
rates were volatile (the upper right cell).  The 1-1/4 percentage point difference in real GDP 
growth between the two cells does suggest some caution in assuming that emerging-market 
economies necessarily benefit from reduced exchange rate variability of the G-3 currencies.   
                                                 
19 Of course, this may well be the case for gross flows but it is not the case for net flows. 
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The lower two panels address the possibility of nonlinearities in the responses of 
developing countries by using an indicator approach.  In the middle panel, data on the 
number of currency crises in developing countries by year are sorted according to G-3 
exchange rate and interest rate volatility (with the crisis indicator defined according to the 
methodology in Frankel and Rose, 1996, as recently updated and extended to a larger country 
set by Reinhart, 2000).20   The bottom panel reports similar calculations using the number of 
banking crises from the same source.  As can be seen in the first column of both panels, 
years in which interest-rate volatility in the United States was below its median over the past 
twenty years were associated with relatively fewer crises in developing countries.  But it is 
also the case that low G-3 exchange rate volatility (the two top rows) was also associated 
with fewer crises.  Thus, while low volatilities in financial asset prices appear conducive to 
avoiding crisis in developing countries, the net benefit of trading between G-3 exchange rate 
and interest-rate volatility would seem to be ambiguous. 
Table 11. Real Capital Flows and Volatility: Total Emerging Market Economies 
(Billions of 1970 U.S. dollars) 
 
 
Net Private Capital Flows 
 
G-3 exchange rate 
variability 
 
Real interest rate volatility is: 
 
 
 
 
 
higher 
 
lower 
 
 
 
higher 
 
14.9 
 
15.0 
 
 
 
lower 
 
19.9 
 
13.4 
 
Net Private Direct Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
higher 
 
4.3 
 
14.8 
    
                                                 
20  The results are similar using the methodology of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
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 lower 7.7 10.0 
 
Net Private Portfolio Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
higher 
 
1.4 
 
3.0 
 
 
 
lower 
 
9.0 
 
5.1 
 
Other Net Private Capital Flows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
higher 
 
5.2 
 
-1.1 
 
 
 
lower 
 
2.0 
 
-2.9 
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund. 
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Table 12. Real GDP Growth, Financial Crises and Volatility: Total Emerging Market 
Economies 
(Billions of 1970 U.S. dollars) 
 
Real GDP growth  
(percent, annual rate) 
 
G-3 exchange rate 
variability 
 
Real interest rate volatility is: 
 
 
 
 
 
higher 
 
lower 
 
 
 
higher 
 
5.1 
 
4.3 
 
 
 
lower 
 
5.5 
 
4.5 
 
Incidence of currency crises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
higher 
 
12.7 
 
27.3 
 
 
 
lower 
 
30.9 
 
29.1 
 
 Incidence of banking crises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
higher 
 
16.7 
 
28.8 
 
 
 
lower 
 
28.8 
 
26.7 
Source: Real GDP, IMF World Economic Outlook (2000); incidence of currency and banking 
crises, Reinhart (2000).  The sample is divided based on the medians of the annual averages 
of the monthly absolute change in the logarithms of the yen/dollar and deutsche-
mark/dollar exchange rates and in the percentage point change in the nominal U.S. three-
month Treasury bill rate. 
 
 
3.   Basic Tests 
Table 13 reports our efforts to put some confidence bands about the estimates of the 
effects of interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility on capital flows.  The table provides the 
coefficients of regressions of real capital flows on a constant (not shown) and dummies 
representing above-the-median values for the volatilities of U.S. real interest rates and G-3 
exchange rates.  There appears to be no significant effect on average of episodes of higher 
volatilities by either measure for topline net capital flows.  Taken literally--no doubt too 
literally–this would indicate there is no particular cost to making real interest rates more 
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volatile, but there are no particular benefits either in damping G-3 exchange rate volatility.  
Higher G-3 exchange rate volatility does appear to pull down net private direct investment in 
a statistically significant manner.  However, there is a more-than-compete offset, also 
statistically different from zero, in other net capital flows.  Real interest rate volatility tends 
only to reduce net portfolio investment in a reliable manner.  
This statistical evidence comes out not much different than the theoretical analysis: 
From the perspective of emerging market economies, the case for limiting G-3 exchange rate 
volatility is not proven.  A similar analysis across regional aggregates, not shown to conserve 
on space, provides no reason to question that judgment. 
 Table 13. Real Capital Flows and Volatility in the North: 1970-1999 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:
 
Independent Variables:
 
Total Emerging Market 
Economies 
  
High Volatility in 
U.S. interest rates 
 
High volatility in G-
3 exachange rates
 
 
 
Net Capital Flows
 
2.52 
(5.82) 
 
-1.95 
(5.91)
 
 
 
Net Direct Investment
 
0.45 
(4.29) 
 
-7.24 
(4.22)
 
 
 
Net Portfolio Investment
 
-5.03 
(2.89) 
 
 0.63 
(2.84)
 
 
 
Other Net Capital Flows
 
 2.64 
(3.69) 
 
9.13 
(3.63)
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 V. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have attempted to analyze and quantify how developments the 
exchange rate arrangements of the G-3 countries influence emerging markets economies. 
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TO do required us to assess the effects of developments in the industrial world on 
capital flows and economic growth in the emerging world.  Recessions in the United States 
are associated with a lower volume of capital flows to emerging markets, FDI flows are 
particularly sensitive to the growth cycle.  Other capital flows (which include bank lending 
and capital flight), however, behave countercyclically--as banks seek to lend abroad as U.S. 
loan demand weakens during recessions.  This offset has, at least historically cushioned the 
blow.  Other things equal, lower U.S. real GDP growth is also associated with lower growth 
in developing countries.  The difference in U.S. GDP growth rates between expansions and 
recessions is 3.3 percent.  Hence, in an “average” U.S. recession, the slowdown alone would 
shave about 3/5 percent off growth in developing countries GDP growth (Table 11).  
However, some regions like Western Hemisphere and the newly industrialized economies of 
Asia would be hit harder. 
But other things are not equal, nominal and real interest rates usually fall during 
recessions as the Federal Reserve attempts to revive the economy.  Real interest rates 
typically fall by about one-and-half percent during recessions, which translates (other things 
equal) to about half a point boost to real GDP growth for the all developing country 
category (Table 11) and considerably more for the relatively indebted nations of Western 
Hemisphere (which maintain access to international capital markets).  
The debate on G-3 target zones should be put into the broader perspective of the 
ongoing debate on exchange–rate arrangements in emerging market economies, which 
usually hinge on credibility.  The advocates for dollarization, for instance, argue that a nation 
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with an uneven history of showing a commitment to low inflation can import the reputation 
of the central bank of the anchor currency.  For the issue at hand, however, there are no 
obvious credibility bonuses to smaller countries should G-3 central banks damp the 
fluctuations of their currencies.  This also implies that the direct benefits to emerging market 
economies should stem only from the lessened volatility of their trade-weighted currencies.  
But as Rose (1999) points out, the benefits of reduced exchange rate variability on trade 
flows, at least, are small compared to adopting a common currency. 
This is also the place to discuss the limitations to our analysis.  In particular, our use 
of linear–or nearly linear models–may understate the consequences of variability in interest 
rates and exchange rates.  To the extent that high world interest rates trigger balance sheet 
problems in emerging markets, the consequences of the tradeoff implied by a target zone 
may be considerable.  Indeed, one repeated message of this paper is that emerging market 
economies, which have already surrendered a high degree of autonomy in their monetary 
policies, often price their goods in foreign–not local–currencies, and can be shut out of 
world financial markets suddenly, are different from their industrial brethren.  
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 Appendix Table 1. U.S. Determinants of Real Capital Flows: 1970-1999 
 
Africa 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Net Capital flows
 
0.04 
(0.19) 
 
0.21 
(0.17)
 
 
 
Net Direct Investment
 
0.00 
(0.04) 
 
-0.07 
(0.03)
 
 
 
Net Portfolio Investment
 
0.04 
(0.05) 
 
-0.09 
(0.04)
 
 
 
Other Net Capital Flows
 
0.00 
(0.20) 
 
0.37 
(0.18)
 
Other Asian Emerging Markets  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Net Capital flows
 
-0.06 
(0.31) 
 
-0.26 
(0.27)
 
 
 
Net Direct Investment
 
0.07 
(0.31) 
 
-0.64 
(0.27)
 
 
 
Net Portfolio Investment
 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
 
-0.04 
(0.05)
 
 
 
Other Net Capital Flows
 
-0.09 
(0.28) 
 
0.42 
(0.25)
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 Appendix Table 2. U.S. Determinants of Real Capital Flows: 1970-1999 
 
Asia, Crisis Countries 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Net Capital flows
 
-0.42 
(0.39) 
 
0.05 
(0.34)
 
 
 
Net Direct Investment
 
0.02 
(0.06) 
 
-0.12 
(0.06)
 
 
 
Net Portfolio Investment
 
-0.05 
(0.15) 
 
-0.25 
(0.13)
 
 
 
Other Net Capital Flows
 
-0.35 
(0.29) 
 
0.43 
(0.29)
 
Western Hemisphere 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Net Capital flows
 
0.70 
(0.91) 
 
-2.71 
(0.85)
 
 
 
Net Direct Investment
 
1.69 
(0.84) 
 
-0.93 
(0.79)
 
 
 
Net Portfolio Investment
 
0.03 
(0.81) 
 
-2.60 
(0.75)
 
 
 
Other Net Capital Flows
 
-0.97 
(0.89) 
 
0.83 
(0.83)
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 Figure 2. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and the U.S. Business Cycle 
 1970-1999 
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 Figure 3. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and the U.S. Business Cycle 
1970 to 1999 (continued) 
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Figure 4. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and the Monetary Policy Cycle 
 (direction of nominal interest rates) 
1970-1999 
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 Figure 5. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and the U.S. Monetary Policy Cycle 
(direction of nominal rates, continued) 
 1970 to 1999 
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Figure 6. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets  
and the Monetary Policy Cycle (level of real rates) 
1970-1999 
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Figure 7. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets  
and the Monetary Policy Cycle (level of real rates, continued) 
1970-1999 
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 54 
 Figure 8. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and Real Interest Rate Volatility 
 1970-1999 
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 Figure 9. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and Real Interest Rate Volatility  
1973 to 1999 (continued) 
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 Figure 10. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and G-3 Exchange Rate Volatility 
 1970-1999 
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 Figure 11. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and G-3 Exchange Rate Volatility 
1970 to 1999 (continued) 
 
 
 
